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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1965, the Western Rock Lobster Fishery has been managed by what is essentially a license 
limitation scheme invoiving restricted entry for boats, and strict controls on the asgregate number of 
pots which can be used by the commercial fishing sector. These core policy instruments have been 
supported by a range of other regulations, such as a closed season for several months, prohibitions on 
talung berried or setose adults, controls on pot design, and other gear restrictions. Many of the 
additional regulations have the effect, at least in part, of reinforcing the effectiveness of the license 
limitation scheme in limiting fishing effort by limiting pot numbers.. 
By most measures, management of this fshery has been highly successful. Biological over-exploitation 
of the fish stock has been prevented, at least until recently. The level of compliance with fishery 
regulations has also improved signiticantiy over the past twenty-five years, and has been achieved with 
relatively low levels of enforcement costs. However, by far the most signrficant achievement, and one 
which is still quite rare in the management of lisheries around the world, has been the generation and 
preservation of slgniscant resource rents (i.e. the long run net returns to ownership of the resource stock 
net of all “real” catching costs other than those related to accessing the fish stock, such as pot, boat, and 
quota license costs). Generation of these rent has been driven pnmaniy by increases in the price of the 
product from subsistence to luxury levels? but it has been the management of the fishery which has been 
primady responsible for preservation of a sigruficant proportion of the potential rent. The tangible 
evidence of this rent is thc prices paid for pot licenses, which are freely tradable. The aggregate 
capitalised value of pot licenses in the fishery now exceeds $1,000 million, which, at a discount rate of 3 
per cent, implies h a t  over $30 million in resource rent is generated annually. 
Notwithstanding these achievements, there is widespread concern that the future profitability, and even 
the viability of the industry is under threat unless the current management practices are reformed. For a 
number of years, there has been continuing increases in nominal fishing effort, and even greater 
increases in effective fishing effort despite continuing attempts to tighten regulations governing the level 
of use and effectiveness of fshing gear in the industry. This increasing effort is linked to higher 
exploitation rates which in turn has led to marked decreases in the estimated size of the breeding stock. 
In particular, growing concern over the level of the breeding stock has led to an emerging consensus that 
further changes to the methods used to manage the Western Rock Lobster Fishery Wiu have to be made 
in order to protect its long term profitability and viability. 
In broad terms, there are two options which could be adopted to manage the fishery on a sustainable 
basis. One is to continue to rely on a modified version of the current management scheme, the essence 
of which is a License Limitation Scheme (license limitation schemes ) involving restricted use of key 
inputs (i.e. pots and boats). If the primary objective of restoration of the breeding stock to a viable level 
(and subsequent preservation at this Ievel) is to be achieved using this option, then the average annual 
catch and exploitation rate will need to be reduced by further reducing effort so that a higher proportion 
of recruits “escape” into the breeding stock. Available means of reducing effort include further 
reductions in the number of licensed pots, and/or further restrictions to the effectiveness of their use 
(e.g. by reducing the length of the fishing season, by changing minimum size limits, and by banning 






Economic theory.’ suggests that reducing catch by reducing licensed pot numbers is likely to increase the 
average cost of effort because it encourages increasingly inefficient combinations of licensed and 
unlicensed inputs. As a result, realized resource rent will be less than potential resource rent, a 
phenomena known in the literature as ”rent dissipation”. Furthermore, any regulations which impede 
rationalisation of boat numbers operating in the fishery in order to meet socio-economic policy goals 
will exacerbate this problem of inefficient input combinations and consequential rent dissipation. 
Likewise, regulations which restxict the effectiveness or “catchability” of licensed fishing gear will also 
dissipate potential rent. Where such regulations restrict the duration or timing of fishmg effort, they may 
reduce the average return per unit of catch as well 3s increasing the average cost of effort, thereby 
fiuther dissipating rent. Finally, if past history repeats itself, there will be a continuing need over time to 
further reduce the number of licensed pots to offset the impact of fishermen’s ingenuity in exploiting 
technological change to firther raise the effective level of effort. Such ongoing change in the regulation 
of the industry would invohe additional administrative, managerial, and political costs. 
The alternative approach is to abandon methods of management based on input controls for one based 
on direct control of output, or level of catch. One intrinsic benefit of catch control based management 
methods vis-a-vis input control based management methods is that the e f f e c h e s s  of the former in 
limiting exploitation rates and ensuring the desired level of escapement to the breeding stock is not 
compromised by advances in fihing technology nor by favourable changes in economic circumstances 
(e.g. higher prices andor lower costs) which proGde an incentive to increase effective fishing effort. 
Consequently, so long as the total allowable catch is introduced before the ftshery is over-exploited. and 
is set at the correct level fiom the outset, there should not be any need for continual adjustments to - 
fishery regulations as is the case with input control based management systems. 
Historically, the most common method of managing a fishery by controlling output has been to rely on a 
variable closed season, whereby the season is closed as soon as the total allowable catch (TAC) is 
reached. Under such a system, no attempt is made to limit level of catch by individual f i s h  h. It is 
widely recognised that the inevitable consequence of a management scheme which relies solely on a 
TAC is total rent dissipation (i.e. net returns from the fishery are driven down to the point where 
catchmg costs at least equal gross returns). For this reason, an hybrid system comprising both elements 
of a License Limitation Scheme and a TAC with variable closed season has been suj&ested. At least in 
the short run, such an hybrid system might support positive aggregate net economic r e m .  but there is 
still likely to be sigruficant economic waste incurred in the ”rush to f&”. 
A more sophisticated approach to output control is to base the management system on individual 
transferable (catch) quotas QTQ’s). The disadvantases of ITQ based management systems have been 
discussed by Copes (1986). In particular, they revoke around difficulties associated with compliance 
and enforcement, and the consequences of actual catches exceeding the TAC. Other management costs, 
such as stock assessment research, are also likely to be greater than is currendy the case. These two 
aspects are addressed in detail elsewhere in the main report, and in special attachments by McLaughlan, 













In theory, an ITQ based management system should foster generation of the mrtVimum potential 
resource rent from the fishery. In practice, there is insufficient evidence available from the 
implementation of ITQ based management systems on which to base a judgement about whether there 
wdl, or will not be any rent dissipation under this type of management system.' Consequently, 
economic models have to be used to try to estimate whether possible changes in the method of fLshhg 
under ITQ based management systems are likely increase aggregate net economic returns from the 
fishery relative to those which could be earned under a modified version of the current system. 
Given that regulations arc set so as to ensure equivalent protection of the breedmg stock under both 
systems, economic theory suggests. that the main benefits of an ITQ based scheme relative to a license 
limitation scheme will include : 
lower cost per unit of effort (i.e. effective pot lift) due to: 
- fewer boats, 
- more cost efficient boat and gear confiOmations, 
- more timely fishing, and 
- more efficient fishers. 
- better matching of the seasonal distribution of catch to seasonal variations in market 
- better cjudity ( c g .  better class size mi.;, more "live", more reds, etc.). 
0 a higher return per unit of catch due to: 
demand, and 
Given that both the level of compliance and the quality and reliability of stock assessment are equivalent 
under each method of management, the primary disadvantages of ITQ's relative to a license limitation 
scheme will include: 
0 higher enforcement and compliance costs. 
0 higher costs or research for stock assessment. 
It is likely that the risk of stock failure also will be affected by the choice of manqement method but 
further research is required to determine both the direction and the magnitude of this effect. The 
evaluation below of long run management options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery reported is 
restricted to one key issue, namely the impact of the two principal alternative maxgjement systems on 
espected resource rent from the fishery due to changes in cost per unit of effort, and in return per unit 
of catch. In particular, estimates are made of the magnitude of rent dissipation under License Limitation 
associated with current regulations in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery, as well as the level of rent 
dissipation consequential on further reductions in the level of licensed inputs @ob) needed to reduce the 
exploitation rate to levels required to protect the breeding stock. Estimates also are made, inter a b ,  of 
changes in catching costs, in catch returns. and in resource rent from the fishery due to: 
reduced boat numbers 
less intensive pot use 
more intensive pot use 
extended fishing season 
altered seasonal catch distribution 
i 
'What is clear is that the likelihood and degree of rent dissipation will be greater if regulations used to remforce a license 
Imitation systeni of rrianagement are not discarded upon adoption of an ITQ based management system. 
4 
ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW 
Alternatives Analytical Approaches 
Because of the complexity and intrinsic uncertainty of evaluating counter-factual situations, the 
approach adopted in this study was to employ several methodologically different procedures in an 
attempt to obtain broadly consistent estimates of the relative benefits and costs of a change from an 
input based management system to an output based management system. Specifically, the following 




In all three approaches, the primary consideration was the need to achieve the pre-eminent objective of 
preserving the fishery on a sustainable basis. To do so, it is essential that the breeding stock be 
maintained at a sufficient level, and this will only be possible if catch is constrained so as to allow 
suEcient animals to escape capture long enough to reach sexual maturity. In recent years, fishing effort 
has been of the order of 12 million pot lifts per annum, which given average seasonal conditions 
affecting recruitment and catchability will result in an annual catch of nearly 11 million kg. in the short 
term, and probably a signtfcantly lower catch on a sustainable basis. fixpert advice is that average 
annual catch needs to be reduced to approximately 9 million kg. if’thc brecding stock is to be 
maintained at sustainable levels. In all three models, the first estimate to bc made was the consequence 
of reducing average annual catch to this sustainable level. 
Relative to a base case defined to approximate current organization of the catching sector and the 
average aggregate net economic returns being generated from the fishery performance, the models 
described above were used to explore the economic consequences of changing the method of managing 
the Western Rock Lobster Fishery in some or all of the following respects: 
retain the License Limitation Scheme and reduce pot lifts and the average catch level 
retain the license limitation schemes and adopt a variable closed scason with a TAC set equal to 9 
million Kg. 
adopt a management system based on ITQ’s, and with a TAC set equal to 9 million Kg. 
extend the end of the fuhing season from June 30 to Sept. 30 for each management method 
prevent decline in pot nos. (by appropriate regulation) 
prevent decline in boat nos. (by appropriate regulation) 
relax regulations governing catching efficiency (e.g. maximum potshoat) 





The bioeconornic model 
.# The bioeconomic model was used to undertake steady state analysis of the economic efficiency of 
alternative management systems (broadly defined) using a modified form of the Schaefer bioeconomic 
model., which is a classical bioeconomic model incorporating both biological stock-dynamics 
relationships and economic relationships. Because the focus in the model is exclusive€y on sustainable 
levels of exploitation of the fishery, this approach provides the best guide to the long run economic 
consequences (e.g. degree of rent generatioddissipation) from retaining the current License Limitation 
Scheme and relymg on reductions in pot numbers to reduce the catch and the exploitation rate in order 
to protect the breeding stock. Given constant average catch value, the model also can be used to predict 
the theoretical maximum level of resource rent which potentially would be generated under an ideal 
management system. It is not possible to use the model to determine whether actual aggregate net 
economic returns from the fishery under an ITQ based management system would a p p r o h t e  this 
theoretical target. 
On the other hand, this approach relies more on abstract theory than the other two approaches, and for 
that reason the results need to be viewed with some skepticism. Moreover, some results may depend 
critically on the value assumed for the elasticity of constrained supply when one or more inputs are 
limited by a License Limitation Scheme. In the absence of research to determine the value of this key 
parameter, estimation of the impact on rent dissipation of changes in the level of fishing effort had to be 
ba.ed on “best guess” estimates togcther with sensitivity analysis to determine the range of possible 
outcomes for all likely values of the elasticity of constrained supply. 
Another disadvantage is the highly aggregated nature of the analysis, which precludes allowing for 
changes in the duration of the fshing season, or in the monthly distribution of the catch (and in 
consequential changes in the average value, or worth, of the catch). This approach &o does not provide 
any detailed insights into how reductions in fshing effort might be achieved. For instance, it is not 
possible to predict the impact of a reduction in licensed pot numbers on number of boats operating in 
the fishery from results obtained from thk model. 
t 
The accounting model 
The accounting model is a simple simulation model of the fishery incorporating primarily economic 
relationships, and can be used to investigate specified sub-problems in more detail. For instance, it is 
used to predict the impact on resource rents (i.e. net returns to the fishery) of introducing regulations to 
maintain boat numbers when pot numbers are reduced. 
There are severe limitations on the questions which can be addressed in an accounting model, but 
because of its simplicity, it does have the virtue of being relatively easy to understand, and can highlight 
some of the key issues in a comprehensible way. Like all models, the utility of the results depends above 
all else on the validity of the values assumed for the parameters in the model. 
6 
The programming model 
The mathematical programming model of the fishery developed for this study incorporates both 
economic relationships and limited biological relationships. It can be used to investigate optimal 
economic behaviour by individual fishermen. 
Given specified management regulations, it also can be used to determine the aggregate configuration of 
inputs which will maximize aggregate net economic returns ftom the fishery (i.e. the method of fshing 
which is collectively optimal for the hypothetical scenario of management by a sole owner). Because the 
model incorporates limited biological relationships, there is some capacity to test the extent to which 
particular scenarios enhance long run viability of the breeding stock. 
This model also is ideally suited to idenhfy the optimal monthly pattern of exploitation of the fishery 
which takes account of both seasonal variations in abundance and catchability on the one hand, and 
seasonal variations in average catch worth on the other hand. For this reason, it provides the best 
available indication of the potential economic benefits of switching to an ITQ based management 
system, although it is difEcult to predict all of the ways in which such a system would evolve in the 
absence of any input based controls. 
BIOECONOMIC MODELLING OF RENT DISSIPATION FROM 1 ,ICEME I21MIT.4T1OX 
Background 
Anderson (1985) has demonstrated that fshery regulation by means of license hitation may generate 
resource rents in a commercial fishery. While restricting the amount of a major input (e.g. pots) used in 
the production of effort may increase the unit cost of effort, the reduction in the total amount of effort 
devoted to the fishery will yield a benefit through a shift of resources to lugher value uses elsewhere. 
Rent dissipation is defined in this paper as the difference between the level of resource rent actually 
generated under a license limitation scheme and that for the benchmark case of a sole owner generating 
maximum potential rent. Dupont (1990) descnies the sources of such rent dissipation as: 
capid stuffin& or input substitution, which results when fshermen attempt to increase their 
catches by using more unrestricted inputs in place of the restricted input; 
fleet redundancy, or excessive effort, due to the fact that the regulator permits more than the 
optimal number of restricted inputs to be employed in the fishery; 
heterogeneous vessels and/or catching technology which allows less efficient finns to continue to 
operate in the fishery. 
As there is a high degree of homogeneity of vessel type in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery, the 
judgement was made that the third source of rent dissipation was unlikely to be important, md it is 
ignored in the rest of this paper. The other two types of rent dissipation were estimated from the 





The basic model for the analysis is illustrated in Figure 1 of t.c present paper. Note that this model is a 
static model, but that conclusions drawn from it about the optimal level of effort are good 
approximations if the intrinsic growth rate for rock lobster is large relative to the discount rate. Fipre  1 
shows a linear schedule for the average revenue of effort, M e ,  such as that which can be derived from 
the Schaefer model (Schaefer 1967), and a perfectly elastic long-run supply curve of effort, Se. It 
should be noted that the Schaefer model is based two contentious assumptions, one being the use of a 
logistic growth function to represent biomasdstock dynamics, and the second being that catch per unit 
of effort is always a constant proportion of the size of the fish stock. In the absence of regulation, long- 
run steady-state equilibrium is at the effort level Eo at which the value of average product of effort 
equals the long-run average cost of effort, Co. Because inputs are combined in the feast cost manner at 
all points on Se, it will be referred to below as the efficient average/marginal cost curve. 
'2. 
-4 
When one or a range of inputs is restricted in supply by license limitation to a level significantly less than 
that which would prevail in an open access fishery, the marginal cost curve for the industry is coincident 
with Se up to level of effort E,  defined as the level of effort at which the limited supply of the restricted 
input becomes binding. Beyond En the constrained industry marginal cost curve diverges from the 
most efficient cost path because increases in effort beyond E, can only be achieved by substituting 
unrestricted inputs for the restricted input. This somewhat inelastic section of the industry's constrained 
marginal cost curve is iabelled12.(Ce . Note that it is equivalent to the short-run marginal cost curve for 
an industry which can only increase the use of some factors in the short-run. 
Equilibrium effort in such an industry win be determined by the intersection of the constrained MCe 
curve with the average revenue of effort curve (Me). This point of intersection is labelled G in Figure 
1, and determines both the actual level of effort (E, ) and the actual value of average revenue of effort. 
Because E, of effort could have been generated at total cost of OCHE,, the efficiency loss from 
excessively costly effort (i.e. rent dissipation due to input substitution, or capital stuffing) is measured by 
the area of the triangle FGH. 
Optimal effort in Figure 1 is depicted by E*? as this level of effort equates efficient marginal cost with 
the marginal revenue of effort (hRe ), thus maximizing potential rent which is represented by area ABC 
in Figure 1. As actual effort exceeds optimal effort, there is a hrther amount of rent dissipation due to 
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Given that the fshery is to be managed by a license limitation scheme, the second best solution is to 
minimize the combined value of rent dissipation due to input substitution and to fleet redundancy. This 
is equivalent to maximizing the realized rent, represented by the area CFGJ. Campbell and Lindner 
(1 990) have derived an analytical result for this second best solution given particular assumptions about 
the form of the key relationships, and the derivation is reproduced as Appendix 1. 
The key determinant of the degree of rent dissipation is the form and slope of the industry constrained 
marginal cost curve, MC,. A license limitation scheme will be successful in minimiZing rent dissipation 
if this marginal cost curve is highly inelastic. Campbell and Lindner (1990) show that the necessary 
conditions are: 
0 The elasticity of substitution between restricted and unrestricted inputs should be ve~y low so that 
there is very limited scope to increase effort indefinitely by using mom and more unrestricted 
The restricted input(s) should he a major component of total factor costs. 
inputs. 
On the face of it, the Western Rock Lobster fishery meets the critical conditions for successll 
management by an appropriately designed license limitation scheme. While level of usage of both boats 
and pots is restricted to the number of licenses issued, it is clear that the restriction on the number of 
pots that can be used is the cffective policy instrument for controlling level of effort and generatmg rent. 
Because of the biology of the Western Rock Lobster, lifting pots more than once every 24 hours ki 
subject to severe diminishing returns. With complete diminishing returns, the absolute limit on the 
number of pot lifts would simply be the product of the number of licensed pots in the fishery multiplied 
by the potential number of fishing days in the fishing season. Since most other types of fishing gear and 
methods are banned by regulation, it should be difficult to substitute other inputs for pots. On the other 
hand, the cost of boats and pots do not represent a major part of c a t c h  costs, so the m e  cost 
curve will be less than completely inelastic. 
This theoretically derived conclusion is supported by empirical evidence from the history of the fishery. 
Fishermen have shown remarkable ingenuity in finding ways to work their pots harder. For most of the 
duration of the license limitation scheme, there has been a steady increase in the ratio of the actual 
number of pot liAs to potential number of pot lifts. Fishermen also have devised means to increase the 
catchability per pot lift, mainly by more careN pot placement. New technologies such as colour depth 
sounders, GPS, mechanised pot lifters, and even remote controlled mini-submarines with video cameras 
and transmitters have been tried, and where succesful have materially assisted fishermen to increase 




Despite a degree of input substitution, tangible evidence of rent generation in this fishery is provided by .- 
the prices at which pot licenses are traded. For the past two years, advertisements asking $1 4,000 or 
more per pot license have not been uncommon. Of course, prices actually paid may be lower than 
asking prices, but even at a price of $12,000 per pot license, the total capital value of the fishery exceeds 
$800 d o n .  It is not easy to decide on an appropriate discount rate to amortise these capital values to 
obtain an estimate of annual rent generated in the fishery. In a study of the market for ITQs in New 
Zealand where data was available on prices paid both for annual lease of quota as well as for quota in 
pespetuity, a figure of 3% was suggested as a reasonable average. This figure is not inconsistent with the 
long tern real rate of return on farm land, although it may be too low if the industry believes that there 
is a SigTllficant degree of sovereign risk associated with holding pot licenses. Because the regulations 
governing this fishery have been changed f e  frequently in recent years, discount rates of 3%, 5?6 and 
7% could be justified, yielding estimates of current annual fishery rent ranging from $24 million to $56 
million. 
The data necessary to estimate the magnitude of the two types of rent dissipation identified above differs 
in the extent to which it is “available” by way of direct observation. For example, the actual level of 
effort in the fishery in any given year (E, ) is directly observable, because the Fisheries Department 
collects detailed data on both catch and effort (as measured by number of pot lifts). Currently there are 
approximately 12 million pot lifts per annum of effort being applied in the Western Rock Lobster 
fishery. Average priced paid to the fBhermen per kilogram of catch is also fairly easy to obtain, 
although it does fluctuate markedly, both intra-seasonally, and between fishing seasons. Some 
judgement is required in choosing a value likely to prevail in the futurc. In the analysis below, a value of 
$18.18 per kilogram was used as an estimate of likely “beach price” in the foreseeable future. This 
reflects a view that the real price of rock lobster is likely to continue to rise in the future. 
Catch per Unit of effort is also quite volatile on a year to year basis due to sigtuticant annul fluctuations 
in the level of recruitment to the fishery. For the purpose of estimating the average lye1 of rent 
dissipation under alternative management regimes, what is really required is the relationship between 
level of effort and the sustainable catch per unit of effort. To derive this relationship, a simple 
simulation model was constructed which could be used to predict a time series of annual catches based 
on data on the actual annual levels of effort applied in the ftshery from 1945 to 1992. The parameters 
of this model are the three coefficients of the logistic growth curve, namely the intrinsic growth rate (r) ,  
ceiling stock size (0, and a catchability coefficient (A). Values for these parameters were obtained by 
of catches in the fishery for the period from 1945 to 1992. The plot of these two time series of annual 
catches is illustrated in Figure 2. There are sigruficant differences between the predicted and actual 
catch in many years, largely due to year to year environmentally determined fluctuations in recruitment 
to the fishery which could not be taken account of in the simulation model. 
Visually fitting the predicted time series of catches derived from the simulation model to the actual series r, 
.I 
. 






Estimated parameter values derived by this method were: 
0 unexploited stock size (0: = 50 million kg 
0 catchability coefficient (A): = .03 
0 intrinsic growth rate ( r ) :  = 0.8 
These parameter values were then used in the logistic growth function to predict sustainable catch per 
unit of effort for various levels of effort required in the anaJysis below. 
The actual level of rent currently being generated in the fishery also needs to be estimated. In Figure 1, 
the amount of annual rent being generated from Ea of effort is depicted by the area QFGJ. As noted 
above, this annual amount of rent cannot be observed directly, but it can be estimated Erom the prices 
paid by fishermen for pot licenses, which are ffeely tradable. The current selling price for pot licenses is 
about $14,000, so with 69,000 licensed pots in the fishery, the capitalised value of the industry’s 
expectations about future rent total $966 million. Using a discount rate of three per cent to amortise this 
value, yields an estimate of annual resource rent being generated in the fishery of about $28 million. If 
the prices being paid by fishermen for pot licenses are based on expectations about continuing increases 
in product prices, andor efficiency gains in catching rock lobster, then this value might over-estimate 
the annual resource rent currently being generated in the fishery, but will still approximate the average 
annual resource rent espectcd for the foreseeable future. 
The other three values required to estimate the level of rent disipation in the fishery are: 
0 the average cost of cfhrt using minimum cost combinations of inputs (i.e. Co) 
the elficient level of restricted effort (ie.  the point at which the constrained marginal cost curve 
for the industry diverges from the efficient marginal cost curve - depicted by Er in Figure 1)  
the slope of the constrained marginal cost curve (g). 
Only one of the above values is needed in order to estimate the other two given that all of the more 
directly observable information discussed above is available. Campbell (1991) in an analysis of the 
Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery has estimated that the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, and 
has an expected value 0.75. The biology of the Southern Rock Lobster in Tasmanian waters differs in 
some respects fiom that of the Western Rock Lobster, and there also are some differences between the 
Tasmanian and West Australian fisheries in terms of regulations and catching technology. Nevertheless, 
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In order to carry out the analysis, it was assumed that the constrained marginal cost curve is linear, and 
that it shifts in a parallel manner when fishery managers alter the number of l i m e d  pots in the lishery. 
Because of uncertainty about the slope of the constrained marginal cost c w e  (g), and about trading 
prices for pot licenses, sensitivity analysis was carried out using the following ranges of values for: 
to 95% of Ea.. OIJB this determines the slope of the restricted marginal cost curve ) 
(NE3 there have been substantial further increases since the analysis commenced). 
-. 
pot license trading prices varied over the range fiom $12,000 to $16,000 per pot 
at 12 d o n  pot lifts, the constrained level of effort, Er, varied over the range fkom 65% 
Results 
The relationships set out in the Appendiv 2 were used to generate a mge of estimates for: 
the minimal average cost, Cg, 
0 the optimal level of effort, l?, and 
0 the maximurn potential rent which codd be generated under sole ownership. 
The results of estimating these variables rue set out in the top part of Table 1. “Minimum” average cost 
@e. based on least cost input combinations) of effort was estimated to range from $12.17 up to $12.49 
per pot lift, and with an average (or “best guess”) value of $12.32 per pot lift. The corresponding range 
of values for optimal effort is 7.2 to 7.4 million pot lifts (average =7.3 million pot lifts), which should 
jield a sustainable catch of 7.9 d o n  to 8.0 d i o n  kg. (average =7.96 million kg.). If this catch were 
caught in the least cost manner, then it should generate a resource rent of $53.4 million to $55.8 million 
(average 454.7 million) per annum. 
Note that the expected value of $54.7 million is the expected maximum potential resource rent which 
could be generated fiom the fishery given current reaulations on such things as duration of the fishing 
season Rot design, and other rermlatiom designed to preserve the breeding stOck3. Because 
bioeconomic models of this type cannot analyse the effect of changes to such regulations, all  of the 
results derived using this model presumes no change in the regulations which reinforce the effectiveness 
of the basic license limitation scheme. With a longer fishing season, with “better’? designed pots to 






For reasons already discussed, effective license limitation schemes generally increase average and 
marginal cost of effort to some degree, and so involve some degree of rent dissipation. Hence maximum 
realisable resource rent under an ITE/TAE system of management will be considerably less than the 
maximum expected value of resource rent of $54.7 million no matter what the level of fishmg effort and 
the size of the catch. Moreover, because the degree of rent dissipation is sensitive to the severity of the 
license limitation scheme and the consequential level of effort actually applied in the fishery, the “second 
best” level of effort under an ITWTAE system of management will h o s t  certady exceed the “first 
best” estimate of 7.3 million pot lifts. 













Hence, the bottom part of Table 1 contains estimates of the impact of scenarios ranging from the status 
quo level of effort of 12 million pot liih down to a reduced level of actual effort of only 8 million pot 
lifts (Le. a 33% reduction in actual effort bought about by the retirement of licensed pots). The results 
presented include e s h t e s  of the impact on the following measures of rent dissipation (i.e. efficiency 
loss) plus associated measures: 
0 efficiency loss (rent dissipation) due to input substitution (area FGH in Figure 1). 
efficiency loss (rent dissipation) due to excess effort (area BDH in Figure 1). 
total efficiency loss (total rent dissipation due to both input substitution and to excess effort). 
0 percentage total efficiency loss (relative to potential maximum rent). 
percentage reduction in number of licensed pots relative to status quo required to achieve assumed 
level of effort. 
0 estimated actual level of aggregate annual resource rent to be realised given specified levels of 
fishing effort. 
0 percentage change in possible realised aggregate annual resource rent relative to the best guess 
estimate of current realised aggregate annual resource rent. 
At current effort levels of I2 million pot l i ,  the sustainable catch predicted by the model is only 9.90 
ndlion kg., which is sigruficantly lower than average annual catches for recent years of about 10.8 
d o n  kg.. It can be seen from Table 1 that given current effort levels, on average, approximately $29.0 
million of sustainable resourcc rent is likely to be realised fiom the fuhery, while $3.2 d o n  plus $22.5 
million will be dissipated due to capital stuffing and excess effort respectively. Total efficiency loss (or 
degree of rent dissipation ) of $25.7 million p a  is the difference between maximum potential 
sustainable resource rent ($54.7 million p.a.) and sustainable annual rent given current effort in the 
iishery ($29.0 million p.a.). Note that short run net returns currently being earned in the industry, which 
are estimated below to be at least $32.4 d o n  per annum, are not sustainable because recent catch 
levels exceed estimated maximum sustainable yield (catch) for the fishery of 10 million kg.. These 
excessive catches are the source of the efficiency loss of $22.5 d o n  due to excess effort. However, 
adjusting the level of effort applied to the fish stock within the framework of the e,xisting license 
limitation management system will have relatively minor effects on the degree of rent dissipation and 
realised resource rent. 
Among the various scenarios presented in Table 1, reducing effort to 10 million pot lifts, and sustainable 
catch to 9.4 million kg., comes closest to maximizing the mean value of realized annual resource rent 
(i.e. minimizing mean aggregate annual rent dissipation). Using best guess parameter values, it is 
estimated that a 35% reduction in the current number of69,613 licensed pots in the fishery is likely to 
be required to achieve a long run reduction in f i s h  effort to 10 million pot lifts. However, note that 
depending on the m e  value of the elasticity of the constrained industry margi~I  cost cume, the required 
reduction in licensed pot numbers could be as low as 13?h, or as high as 40%. Politically, it may be 
difficult to achieve the required reduction, whatever its magnitude. 
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Even if the required pot reduction could be achieved, annual resource rents would only increase by 
about $8.31 million (29%), and rent dissipation, t o w  between $9.5 million and $25.2 million, would 
still remain, with a value of $17.4 million being most likely. Hence maximum sustainable rent is unlikely 
to exceed $37.5 d o n ,  (69% of potential) if a license limitation scheme is retained. Aggregate realised 
sustainable resource rent under a license limitation scheme is relatively insensitive to reductions in 
licensed pot numbers (and consequential reductions in the equilibrium level of effort) because even 
though achievable reductions in rent dissipation due to fleet redundancy can be substantial, they will be 
more or less offset by large increases in rent dissipation due to input substitution @e. capital stuffing). 
The estimate of expected aggregate level of annual resource rent dissipation of $1 7.4 million associated 
with the second best level of fishing effort under a license limitation scheme also provides an estimate of 
the potential gain in economic efficiency from switching to a management system based on ITQ’s. On 
the one hand, this could be regarded as an upper bound estimate because, as noted above, there may 
well be other unanticipated sources of rent dissipation under an lTQ based management system which 
will pa@, or even totally offset the potential gains identified in this analysis. On the other hand, the 
above estimate does not include any allowance for gains in efficiency which might be possible due to 
relaxation of regulations which reinforce the effectiveness of the basic licmse limitation scheme, such as 
Iimits to the duration of the fishing season , and/or controls on pot design which reduce possible 
catching power. While at least some such regulations also could be relaxed if the license limitation 
scheme was retained, to do so while reducing the size of the catch to sustainablc levels would require 
even greater reductions in pot numbers. and much larger associated amounts of rent dissipation due to 
capital stuf€ing than those estimated above. 
With fishery management changes such as a longer fishing season, and with 3 “better” distribution of 
effort throughout the season, the potential resource rent fiom the fishery could be considerably liuger 
than $54.7 million. For reasons to be discussed below, much of the potential increase in annual resource 
rent which mght be generated under either management system will only be realised if substantial 
rationalisation of boat numbers in the fishery is allowed to proceed. Under a license limitation scheme, 
this gain in efficiency is unlikely to be fidly rea3ised because the use of pots will become increasingly 
expensive relative to boats4 as the number of pot licenses is reduced in order to reduce effort. This 
distortion in the cost of pot use relative to boat use will both inhibit exlshng pressures for rationalisation 
of boar numbers, and increasingly will provide the incentive for more intensive and uneconomic use of 
pots, such as pulling each pot more than once per day. In fact, f irher investment in expensive 
electronic navigation equipment, further expenditure on travel to the “hot spot” fishing grounds, and 
more time spent on pot placement, together with more intensive pot use are likely to be the main sources 
of ever increasing rent dissipation under a license limitation scheme. 
To sum up, under a License Limitation Scheme, protection of the breeding stock will require 
increasmgly drastic reductions in pot numbers or equivalent changes in other regulations, either of which 
will incur substantial efficiency losses in the form of rent dissipation. Any changes in regulations, such 
as an extended season, which nught improve indusfry returns, wiU require even more drastic reductions 
in pot numbers. Hence, there is only limited potential to improve the level ofrealised aggregate net 
economic returns from the fishery under this form of management. 







ACCOUNTING MODEL ANALYSIS 
The aim of the analysis reported in this section was to derive estimates of the annual net (economic) 
returns being generated in the fishery in the short run given defined levels and seasonal patterns of 
effort and catch, given specified assumptions about the values of a few key parameters, and given 
existing economic structure in the catching sector of the industry. Short run annual net returns may not 
equate with annual resource rents for several reasons. For instance, there is no necessary reason why 
short run net returns should be sustainable in the long run, and therefore they can give a very misleading 
impression of the level of resource rents. 
The level of resource rents being generated in a fishery also depends on the economic structure in that 
fishery. As noted above, the economic structure of the industry is determined, inter aha, by the method 
of fishery management. Consequently, the accounting model was used to explore the consequences of 
changes to some aspects of the economic structure of the industry, and for reasons discussed above 
including in particular the average number of pots per boat. Nevertheless, the results reported below 
provide an imperfect guide to the consequences of changing the method of management in the fishery 
because of the difficulty of predicting all of the ways in which economic structure will change in 
response to a change in thc system of management. 
The starting point for [he ;inalysis of changes to the economic structure of the industry is a base case 
scenario embodying actual average monthly patterns of effort and catch for the period fiom 1980 to 
1992 inclusive. Figure 3 presents an oveniew of this dah, while Appendix 5 con& more detail for 
each zone. All of the alternative sccnarios are based on assumed monthly shares of a defined total 
allowable catch (TAC), which in each case was set e q d  to a sde sustainable level of 9 d o n  kg. 
These catch sccnanos for the fishery were combined with the estimated current economic structure in 
the catching sector of the industry, which were derived from a combination of survey data and other 
sources. More details on these data sources are provided in Appendix 3> and the key economic 
parameters derived from them are set out in Table 2. 
.4 detailed outline of thc computational method used to calculate annual economic net returns to the 
catching sector of the industry is provided in Appendix 4. In brief, historical averages, or assumed 
parameters for catch per unit efrort, number of days fished, and pots per boat were used to calculate 
corresponding monthly levels of effort, and minimum required pot and boat numbers. These structural 
variables were then combined with the economic par,meters (average costs and monthly catch worth) as 
sct out in Table 2 to derive estimates of short run awegate indushy catching costs, revenue, and net 





= Total Revenue - Total Costs 
= C(monthly beach price/&. of catch* monthly catch) I 
N . B .  Beach price is based on "worth/kg" as estimated by P. Monaghan 
. Total Costs = C( boat costs; pot costs; trip costs; pot lift costs; catch costs ) 
Boat Costs = cost/boat* Required boat nos. 
Pot costs = cost/pot* Required pot nos. . .  
Trip Costs = cost/trip* Required boat nos.*No. days fished 
Pot Lift Costs= cost/pot lift* Number of pot lifts 
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Number of pot lifts by month required to achieve a specified seasonal catch pattern can be calculated 
simpIy provided that catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is known. Historical average monthly patterns of 
“managerial” variables such as catching technology and care and time taken in pot placement, as well as 
on various environmental factors which are imperfectly understood. It is well documented that the 
downward trend over time in CPUE due to declining stock levels has been ameliorated to some degree 
by the above ”managerial” factors. The extent to which this is likely to continue in the future will 
depend upon the method of management used in the fishery, and in the case of a license limitation 
scheme, on the severity of further pot reductions. Other things being equal, CPUE is likely to be higher 
(i.e. decline slower) under a license limitation scheme than under an ITQ based management system. 
Because there is no evidence available on which to base predictions of the magnitude of such a 
difference, it was not built into the calculations in the accounting model. 
catch per pot lift are depicted in Figures 4 and 5 .  Apart from stock abundance, CPUE will depend on -. 
Monthly minimum required pot numbers was calculated fiom the corresponding levels of required 
effort, and fiom an assumption about number of days fished. In any given month during the mandated 
fishing season, the expected number of “available” fishing days will be a function both of expected 
weather conditions for that time of the year as well of current boating and catching technology. It can be 
seen fiom Figure 6 that number of days fished per year has been increasing steadily since the 
introduction of the license limitation scheme to manage effort levels in the fishery. In recent years. this 
trend has continued despite sigruficant reductions in the number of pots licensed for commercial use. 
. Appendix 6 presents historical patterns of number of days fished per month for each month of thc 
fishing season. In the more “productive” months. such as December, March and April, it can be seen 
that number of days fished is at, or closely approaching the masimum number of available “days“ so 
long as pots are only pulled once daily. In other months, historically the number of days fished has been 
much lower than the theoretical maximum, and is still trending upwards. Moreover, an analysis of data 
on fishmg effort for a sample of individual boats (see Appendix 7 for histograms for selccted months ) 
revealed that while almost all boats are pulling their pots on every available day during the “productive” 
months, only some boats are doing so during the “unproductive” months. Consequently, it would seem 
that there is still considerable potential for hrther increases in eEort under a license Limitation scheme. 
Subjective predictions of potentially available fmhing days by month were based on the above evidence, 
and used in the accounting model to estimate pot numbers required on an annual basis to achieve the 
specified seasonal pattern of catch and effort. 
To estimate required boat numbers, an assumption had to be made about average number of pots per 
boat used in the industry. Based on data for recent fishing seasons, a value of 104 pots per boat was 
assumed for most scenarios. However, for reasons discussed above, number of pots per boat is Wiely to 
be appreciably larger under an ITQ based management system than under a license limitation scheme, 
so an average value of 144 pots per boat was assumed in some scenarios. 
In other scenarios, the implications of adopting a policy of preventing rationalisation of boat numbers by 
regulating number of pots per boat was investigated by fixing boat numbers at the current5 levels of 669 
boats. Average pot numbers per boat in these scenarios was simply the ratio of minimum pot numbers 
required to take the specified catch to the mandated number of boats. 
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Table 3 summarises the results of using this model to evaluate the following scenarios6 : 
0. the base case invohmg status quo management, includmg: 
an unsustainable catch of about 10.8 million kg., 
no change m boats (669) or pot nos. (69,613), and 
a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats (558) and pots (58,031), and 
a close to the Sshhg season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of pots (58,031), but boat nos. constant (669) by regulating potshoat, and 
a close to the Sshhg season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of pots (58,031), but even fewer boats (403) by permitting more potshoat, 
and a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats (445) and pots (46,264), and 
a close to the fishing season on September 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of pots (46,264), but boat nos. constant (669) by regulating potshoat and 
a close to the fishing season on September 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of pots (46,264), but even fewer boats (321) by permitting more potsboat, 
and a close to the fishing season on September 30. 
1. the first case involving: 
2. the second case involving: 
3. the third case involving: 
4. the fourth case involving: 
5.  the fifth case invohhg: 
6. the sixth case involving: 
As note above, because this model does not incorporate any biological relationships, it is best suited to 
estimating short run economic impacts. Thus achieving a reduction in catch by pro rata reductions in 
boat and pot numbers in order to protect the breeding stock (scenario 1) has no effect on net returns per 
pot or per boat, at least in the short run, but does reduce aggregate net returns to the industry in 
proportion to the reduction in catch. In the longer run, this lower exploitation rate should improve stock 
abundance, and lead to higher catch rates and the need for even fewer pots and boats to take the defined 
catch If this outcome eventuates, aggregate net returns as well as net returns per pot and per boat will 
increase above those estimated tiom the model. 
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A comparison between scenarios 1,2, and 3 h@dights the pivotal importance of the number of pots per 
boat to the economic performance of the industry, and the corresponding implications for rationalisation 
of boat numbers. This parameter value has been increasing steadily in recent years, and the cment level 
of approximately 104 potshoat would h o s t  c e w  be h&er in the absence of regulations limiting 
maximum number of potshoat. As steps are taken to reduce catch levels, the economic incentives to 
increase number of potshoat is likely to intensify. 
Cases 1,2, and 3 all depict scenarios where catch is reduced to 9 million kg. by reducing pot numbers to 
58,031 pots. If boat numbers are permitted to decline so as to maintain an ind- average of 104 pots 
per boat, then the impact of reducing catch to a safe sustainable level can be achieved with only a 
modest reduction m industry net returns fiom $32.4 million to $27.0 million. Scenario 3 represents a 
situation when the average value of this parameter increases to 144 potdboat while reducing the catch 
to 9 million kg.. Despite the lower catch and fewer pots, net returns to the industry are some $16.5 
million greater than for the base case. Net returns per pot are nearly double, and net returns per boat 
nearly treble those for the base case scenario. While introduction of an ITQ based management system 
is likely to lead to an increase in pots per boat for reasons already discussed, the magnitude of the 
change may not be as large as that assumed in scenario 3. Conversely, if rationalisation of boat numbers 
is prevented by even tighter regulations on numbers of pots per boat, then scenario 2 indicates that net 
retums per pot and per boat are likely to be less than half that for the base case, while industry net 
retums will be reduced by about $20 million. 
Possible short run economic impacts of extending the close of the fishing season to September 30 are 
depicted in scenarios 4, 5, and 6, which in all other respects correspond to scenarios 1, 2, and 3 
respectively. Note that these estimated impacts reflect both changes in the monthly levels of catch worth 
as estimated in the attached marketing report, as well as changes in the average cost of effort and the 
average catch per unit of effort due to extending the fishing season. 
The most striking feature of the result is the sensitivity of the estimated increase in industry net returns 
to policies on boat numbers. Depending on the assumptions made about numbers of pots per boat, this 
analysis suggests that extending the season by three months may or may not have a s@cant impact on 
industry net returns. If boat numbers are not permitted to fall below current levels, $ten the gains in net 
returns fiom spreading the defined catch over more of the year are unlikely to be much larger than $4.3 
million However, if boat numbers are allowed to vary in proportion to pot numbers (cases 1 and 4), so 
as to maintain constant nmbers of pots per boat, then extending the fishing season may increase 
industry net returns by up to $22 million. However, this increase in net returns due to a longer season 
reduces to $18.3 million if additional rationalisation of boat numbers occurs (cases 3 and 6) so as to 
increase pots per boat to 144. 
To sum up, there is a very strong interaction between policy on boat numbers and changes in industry 
net returns resulting fiom changes in other aspects of management in the Western Rock Lobster 
Fishery. 
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PROGRAMMLNG MODEL ANALYSIS 
In many respects, the structure of the mathematical programming model, and the assumptions on which 
it is based are similar to those of the less sophisticated accounting model. Like the accounting model, the 
programming model provides estimates of the net (economic) returns being generated in the fishery in 
the short run given a defined total allowable catch (TAC), given specified assumptions about the vah~es 
of a key parameters and constraints, and given an assumed economic structure in the catching sector of 
the industry. Unlike the accounting model, the programming model identifies the optimal seasonal 
patterns of effort and catch which maximise net returns subject to specified constraints. So far as 
possible, the same parameter values as set out in Table 2 for the accountmg model have been assumed 
in the programming model. 
The principal ways in which the programming model differs from the accounting model are as follows: 
0 boat and pot numbers, and monthly effort levels are determined simultaneously rather than 
sequentially 
0 subject to defined constraints on, inter alia, the level of total catch, the monthly distribution of 
effort is optimised so as to maximise net economic returns to the industry 
0 the mathematical programming model incorporates some simple representations of steady state 
population dynamics in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery which allow for natural mortality and 
for animals to grow in size over time (if they are not caught). In addition, the model ensures that 
monthly catch levels are consistent with stock availability, and can estimate whether sufficient 
animals “escape” into the breeding stock 
0 the results from appropriately defined scenarios provide a guide to behaviour of fishermen under 
an ITQ based management system 
The scenarios evaluated using the programming model were as follows: 
0 0. the base case involving status quo License Limitation Scheme management, including: 
an unsustainable catch of about 10.8 million kg., 
no change in boats (669) or pot nos. (69,576), and 
a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, and 
a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced pot nos., but boat nos. held constant (669) by regulating potshoat, and 
a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
3. the third case involving a TAC with variable closed season management, and including: 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
constant nos. of pots (69,576), and constant nos. of boats (669) and 
a close to the fishing season as soon as the TAC is reached 
4. the fourth case simulating aspects of an ITQ based management system, and including: 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, and 
a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
0 1. the h t  case involving License Limitation Scheme management, and including: 
0 2. the second case invohing License Limitation Scheme management, and includmg: 
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5 .  the f5fth case simulating aspects of an ITQ based management system, and including: 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced pot nos., but boat nos. held constant (669) by regulating potshoat, and 
a close to the fisiung season on June 30. 
0 11. the eleventh case invohng License Limitation Scheme management, and including: 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, with more potshoat (144), and 
a close to the fihmg season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, with more podboat (144), and 
a close to the fishing season on June 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, and 
an extended fishing season closing on September 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 d o n  kg., 
reduced pot nos., but constant boat nos. (669) by regulating potshoat, and 
an extended fishing season closing on September 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, and 
an extended fishing season closing on September 30. 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced pot nos., but boat nos. held constant (669) by regulating potshoat, and 
an extended fishing season closing on September 30. 
3 1. the thirty fist case involving License Limitation Scheme management, and including: 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, with increased nos. of potshoat (1 44), and 
an extended fishing season closing on September 30. 
34. the thuty fourth case simulating aspects of an ITQ based management system, and including: 
a sustainable catch of about 9 million kg., 
reduced nos. of boats and pots, with increased nos. of pots/boat (144), and 
an extended fishing season closing on September 30. 
14. the fourteenth case simulating aspects of an ITQ based management system, and including: 
21. the twenty first case involving License Limitation Scheme management, and including: 
22. the twenty second case involving License Limitation Scheme management, and including: 
24. the twenty fourth case simulating aspects of an ITQ based management system, and including: 
25. the twenty fiflh case simulating aspects of an ITQ based management system, and including: 
The results of evaluating the above scenarios are presented in Appendix 9, ad summarised in Tables 4 
and 5. While considerable trouble was taken to try to make this model directly comparable with the 
accounting model, structural differences between the two models inevitably resulted in some differences 
in estimated industry net returns. However, these differences are relatively minor, and the differences 
between the respective base case results and those of alternative scenarios are even d e r .  For 













In Appendix 9, t h m  is a separate table of results for each scenario. Answer Report I presents results for 
both the base case scenario, in the column headed ‘‘original Value", and for scenario 1 in the column 
headed "Final Value". In all other A m e r  Reporb, it is the "Final Value" column which contains the 
results for that scenario. The row titled "Profit Total" contains the estimated value for annual industry 
net return, and the following rows contain estimates of the level of (constrained) catch, numbers of 
boats, pots, and potlifts by month. The final set of rows contain vahes for "transfer activities" designed 
to ensure that enough animals remain at the end of the fishing season to maintain a sustainable breeding 
stock. 
Scenarios 1, 2, 11 , 21,25 and 31 are all intended to simulate variations on the current license hitation 
scheme of management, and are summarised in Table 4. It can be seen that reducing catch under an 
IlWTAE based system by reducing pot and boat numbers (case 1) reduces aggregate net returns by 
about $5.7 &on p.a., while reducing pot numben only but preventing any decline in boat numbers 
(case 2) reduces aggregate net returns by over $18.5 million p.a.. These estimates approximate those 
obtained from the accounting model, but neither accounts for any offsetting losses due to additional rent 
dissipation likely to accompany attempts to reduce effort and catch while retaining the ITE/TAE system. 
Again, the results clearly demonstrate that failing to allow rationalisation of boat numbers when the 
catch is reduced to sustainable levels involves a large opportunity cost. For the current length fkhing 
season, the cost is estimated at about $13 million (case 1 - case Z), but with an extended season up to 
$30 million (case 21 - case 22) could be involved. 
Pot and boat numbers are both treated as fi-eely variable (up to current levels) in cases 1, 11, 21, and 3 1. 
A comparkon of cases 1 with 21, and of 11 with 31, which mer only in the length of the fislung 
season indicates that the potential gain &om an extra three months fishing under an l " f A E  based 
system is ae ly  to be substantial, and of the order of $17 million to $21 million. However, where boat 
numbers arc constrahed to equal current numbers, the potential gain is much smaller. A comparison of 
cases 2 and 22 yields an estimate of only $4.3 million. Note that an ITElTAE system is likely to inhibit 
rationahtion of boat numben 
* 
t 
It has been suggested that a sustainable rishery could be achieved by setting a Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC), and closing the fishery as soon as the TAC was reached. Scenario 3 estimates the consequences, 
given current technology and economic structure, of reducing amage catch levels to 9 million kg. while 
main- both pot and boat numbers by means of a TAC and a variable closed season. It can be seen 
fiom Table 5 that even in the short nm, this scenario involves a greater loss of economic efficiency than 
either cases 1 or 2, and on average will result in closure of the fishery somethe in Apnl. Such an 
outcome is clearly waste@ and reduces industry net returns by about $21 million relative to the base 
case. In the long run, these efficiency losses would almost certady swell to the point where catching 
costs at least matched gross revenue as fishermen inwsted more and more heavily in boats, gear, and 
equipment in order to catch as much of the TAC as possible before the season closed. 
Table 5 Summarises the results for scenarios 4, 5, 14, 24, 25, and 34, each of which simulates an ITQ 
based management system by allowing monthly levels of effort to be constrained onty by available 
numbers of fishing days and pots, and to be selected so as to maximize industry net returns. Both pot 
and boat numbers are allowed to vary freely up to maxima equal to current levels in cases 4, 14,24, and 
34, while boat numbers are constrained to equal current numbers in cases 5 and 25. In cases 4 and 5, 











In the main, the findings fiom the results in Table 5 simply reinforce the points made above, but there 
are some important differences. By switching to an ITQfTAC based system while reducing catch to 9 
million kg., it is quite possible that aggregate net returns might actually increase by about $4.3 million 
(relative to the base case) so long as both pot and boat numbers (case 4) are permitted to reduce to the 
most efficient level. Moreover, the actual gains realised rmght even be larger than this estimate if rent 
dissipation due to capital stuffing also declines in importance under an ITQRAC based system. Some 
idea of the importance of this consideration is provided by the difference in annual net returns of $1 5.2 
million between cases 4 and 14. The starting point for these two cases Wered only in the economic 
structure implicit in the mbdel (average pots per boat assumed was 104 for case 4, and 144 for case 14). 
The latter value is probabiy best treated as an upper bound, but it does illustrate that under an ITQ/TAC 
based system, it might be possible to reduce catch to sustainable levels and increase annual net r e m  
by up to $19.5 million at the same time even if the season is not extended. Since introduction of ITQ’s 
should make it easier to extend the season, the upper bound on increase in annual net returns could 
exceed $30 million. 
However, it needs to be stressed that the possibility of such large gains materialking depends on very 
large reductions in boat numbers (i.e. down to less than 300 boats). If rationalisation of boat numbers is 
prevented, increases in net returns will be much more modest because of the large opportunity cost of 
preserving boat numbers, which could range fiom nearly $20 million (case 4 - case 5) if the length of 
the f i s h  season is not extended, and up to $27.5 million (case 24 - case 25) if it is extended by three 
months. 
An appreciation of the possible gains fiom extending the fislung season under an ITQ based system can 
be gained by comparing case 4 with 24, and case 14 with 34. In all these cases, both pot and boat 
numbers are allowed to vary freely (up to current levels). Aggregate annual net returns are estimated to 
increase by about $16 million to $17 million due solely to differences in the length of the fisiung season. 
These estimates are sltghtty less than the estimated potential gain from an extra three months fishing 
under an ITEfTAE based system. Where boat numbers are held constant, the gain is only of the order 
of $4.3 million, again similar to but smaller than the figure for a license limitation scheme. 
Key parts of the results presented above are rearranged in Table 6 to facilitate a comparison of industry 
net returns from an lTE/TAE based system with those possible under a system of ITQ’s. In particular, 
this table highlights the pivotal role of policy towards rationalisation of boat numbers, and the 
corresponding importance of the impact of type of management system on number of pots per boat. 
Consider first the case depicted in column one where boat numbers are held constant, and the duration 
of the fishing season is unchanged. Changing the management system from one based on ITE/TAE’s to 
one based on ITQ/TAC’s is estimated to increase net returns from $15.8 million to $18.9 million. 
However, this gain is almost totally offset by additional costs of research and enforcement, which were 
deemed to be $1 million and $1.7 million respectively. If the season is extended to September 30, but 
boat numbers are still held constant, the increase in industry annual net returns from adopting ITQ’s of 
$7.7 million is still largely offset by additional research and enforcement costs. 
I 
If rationalisation of boat numbers is permitted, prediction of the consequences of a change to the 
management system is rather more difficult. As noted above, an ITE/TAE system is likely to inhibit 
rationalisation of boat numbers, and thus result in rather fewer potshoat on average than would pertain 
under an ITQ/TAC based system. Just how large this difference would be has to be a matter for 
conjecture because of a lack of hard empirical evidence on which to base a realistic assumption. 
m m t f  
r o r r  
b r  
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The second and fifth columns in Table 6 are based on an assumption that the current industry average 
of 104 pots per boat will continue under a restructured I"AFi system as well as under an ITQ/TAC 
based system. These net gains in these columns probably underestimate the potential gains of switching 
systems by a significant margin, because they take no account of efficiency gains fiom better input 
combinations and/or more effective fishing gear likely to be fostered under an ITQ based management 
system. Hence these columns are best regarded as providing lower bound estimates of potential 
efficiency gains for the current, and an extended season respectively. If the introduction of lTQ's 
increases average numbers of pots per boat, then the relevant parts of the third and sixth columns 
arguably provide a better estimate of industry net returns for this system of management. The last two 
columns in Table 6 provide such a comparison, namely between cases 1 and 14 for a season closing on 
June 30, and between cases 21 and 34 for an extended season. Depending on length of season, this 
comparison suggests potential efficiency gains of switching systems of either $22.6 million or $16.2 
million, which should be treated as upper bound estimates of net gains if rationahation of boat numbers 
is permitted. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To judge the slgniricance of estimates of the impact of any particular change in the system of 
management in the Western Rock Lobster fishery on aggregate annual net returns, it is necessary to 
establish a numeraire or benchmark against which any predicted changes can be measured. In the 
section on the bioeconomic model, sustainable annual resource rents currently being generated in the 
fishery were estimated at about $28 million. This estimate is somewhat lower than that of short run 
annual net economic returns estimated at $32.4 million in the accounting model, or at $34.3 million in 
the programming model. $50 million has been adopted in the discussion that follows as a broad estimate 
of current gross income collectively being earned in the industry as a return to management, as a return 
on "real" capital invested in the fishery, and as a (resource) rent on the fBh stock. Various estimates of 
gains and losses are expressed in the discussion below as a percentage of this measure of current 
aggregate annual gross income. 
s 
There are several conclusions to be drawn fkom the analysis reported above. Some relate to changing 
one or other aspect of the method of managing the Western Rock Lobster fishery, so not all of the 
estimated benefits are independent and additive. Specific conclusions are: 
given current regulations on such things as duration of the fishing season, pot design, and other 
regulations designed to preserve the breeding stock, thefirst best optimal level of fishmg effort is 
7.3 million pot lifts, which should on average yield a sustainable catch of about 8.0 million kg. E 
this catch were caught in the least cost manner, thm it could generate resource rents of up to $53 
million per annum. 
currently some $25 million (50%) of potential resource rents are being dissipated under the license 
limitation system of management. Even without a longer fishing season, without "better" designed 
pots to enhance catching power, and without adjustmg the seasonal catch pattern to better match 
market conditions, some or all of this potential rent might be realised if an ITQlTAC based 
system of management were adopted. 
reducing the catch to sustainable levels under an ITE/TAE based management system closing on 
June 30 is most unlikely to increase realised resource rents even if rationalisation of boat numbers 




- .  
0 if boat numbers are held at current levels by policy measures under an ITE/TAE based 
management system, measures adopted to reduce catch levels to sustainable levels will almost 
certaidy result in large losses in industry annual net returns. With the current Sshing season, these 
losses could up to $20 million (40%), and of the order of $14 million (28%) if the season is 
extended. 
0 there are potentially large economic gains in terms of industry net returns to be gained fiom 
allowing market forces to reduce the number of boats operating in the industry to economically 
efficient levels. For a fislung season of the current duration, it has been estimated to be of the 
order of $13 million (26%) of current income collectively being earned in the industry. This 
amount could be as large as $30 d o n  (60%) for an exqended season lasting until September 30. 
However, it needs to be stressed that the possibility of such large gains materiatising depends on 
very large reductions in boat numbers (i.e. down to less than 300 boats). 
there are potentially large economic gains in terms of industry net returns to be gained Erom 
extendmg the duration of the fishing season. Estimates range from $16 million to $21 million so 
long as boat numbers are permitted to fall to economically efficient levels, but otherwise will be 
comparatively small. 
there may be potentially large economic gains to be gained fiom changing the system of managing 
the Western Rock Lobster fishery fiom one based on ITE’s/TAE to one based on ITQ’flAC. 
Depending on length of season, potential gains in industry net returns of switching systems could 
range from neghgible to $22 million (44%) for a June 30 closure, and from $2 million (4%) to 
$16 d o n  (32%) for a September 30 closure. 
36 
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. APPENDIX 1 A Model of Rent Dissipation and Second Best Effort 
Under License Limitation (from Campbell and Lindner 
(1990)) 
We need to specify functional forms for the average product of effort schedule 
and the supply or marginal cost of effort schedule consistent with the 
assumptions we have made so far: 
ARe = C[ - bE subject to CI, b > 0: P I  
. 
i 
,VCe = Co + C1 ( E  -EB)  subject to Co, C1 > 0, E - EB. 
EB = [(Cl + b)E - (a  -Co)]C1-1. 
P I  
[3 1 
The equilibrium condition for the fishery is ARe = MCe, and so it follows that: 
The tishery rent can be defined as: 
/==(a - co - hE)E - 
and the level of effort which gives a first-best optimum can be calculated as: 
E* - 0.5(o - C0)b-1. [51 
The efficiency loss resulting trom the input restriction can be expressed as: 
L = 0.5(MCe - CO)(E - EB), [61 
which, on substituting for hlCe and EB, simplifies to: 
L = 0.5[(n - CO) - bE12C1-1. [71 
The second-best optimum level of effort, €, is obtained by choosing E to 
maximise: 
W = - F -- L. The solution value is: 
? l? = 0S(a - Co)b--I[(C1 + b)/(C1 + b/2)] 
= E* [(Cl + b)/(Cl + b/2)]. [81 
Given our assumptions about the production of effort, the proportion of the 
restricted input excluded from the fishery by the limitation program is defmed as: 
B = 1 - (Q/EO). Substituting for EB and Eo and setting E and E gives the level 
%f the second-best optimum licence limitation program: 
B = O.S[(Cl + b)l(C~ + b/2)]. 
APPENDIX 2: Derivation of Formulae to Estimate Kev Parameter Values 
and Measures of Rent Dissipation Under License Limitation 
In Figure 1, CFGJ depicts realised aggregate annual resource rent from Ecr of 
effort and associated average revenue of effort, AR(EcJ 
CFGJ = CHGJ - FGH 
= ( AR(En) - Co )* ( Ea + Er ) 
= ( g / 2 )* ( E[/ A 2  - €).A* ) 
where g = ( AR(EcJ - CO ) / ( ECl - E,- ) 
Hence : 
Er = ( Ec, A2 - ( CFGJ / 2) ) 
Rent dissipation due to input substitution : 
FGH = ( AR(EcJ - CO ) *  ( Ec/ - ET ) / 2 
= ( g /  2 )*  ( €[/ - El. ) 
In the Schaefer model, sustainable average revenue of effort: 
.Me = P * A * K * ( I - ( 2 * E * A ) / r )  
where P = price of catch 
A = catchability coefficient 
K = unexploited stock size 
E = sustained level of effort 
r = intrinsic growth rate 
A =  
Optimal effort, 
Eopt. , = ( 1 - CO / ( P * A * K ) )  * ( r / ( 2 *A)) ; 
and corresponding maximum potential sustainable annual resource rent is: 
Opt. rent = ( P * A * K *( 1 - Eopt * A / r ) - CO ) * Eopt 
Rent dissipation due to fleet redundancy : , 




APPENDIX 3: Data Sources for the Accounting and Programming Models 
ABS (or Fishery returns) (1964-1992) 
-m te Catch (Kg.1: by Month and by Zone 
Amemte Effort (uot lifts): by Month and by Zone 
Awegate Licensed pots (nos.1 by Year and by Zone 
Fremantle Fishing Cooperative (1992/93 fishing season): 
(individual boat data for an anonymous sample of 59 boats for the) 
No. Dot licenses: by Month 
Catch Kg. ) :  by Month, Zone, and by Size Grade 
Exuenses for Bait. Fuel, Gear and Other: by Month 
Department of Fishery Returns (1991/92 & 1992193 fishing seasons) 
(individual boat data for the same anonymous sample of 59 boats above 
- matched using double blind coding procedure to preserve anonymity of boat licensees) 
No. daw fished: by Month and by Zone 
Crew Nos.: by Month 
Location Iblock) fshed: by Month 
Landing ~ o r t :  by Month 
No. D O ~ S  used: by Month 
Catch (I&.): by Month and by Zone 
Jurien fishermen informal survey - (1992/93) fishing seasons 
No. pots used and Crew Nos. 
No. daw fished: by Month 
Distance travelled to fishing wound: by Month 
Catch WE.): by Month 
Camtal Value: (by type of asset) 
All expenses: (by month and by type of expense) 
Economic study of S.A. Rock Lobster industry - Edwards & Presser 
. 
The ,model ,contained ,the foilowing -variables, which were .either derivecl from specified .data sources or 
calculated ,a.s :according to the l,equations 6below: 
\O/O catch .by Imo-nth- ,(based ,on w e r w  :fOr.rec,eat lfisbing seasons) 
-ate Ganual'TAC- (based on m e  for recent lishtng seasons, or assumed) 
'M6ntMy .ca$ch 
= TAG * monthly % share 
, Number of$pot .lifts 
= (monthly ,catch/.(. 
Potential ,no. .days &hed %by ,month -,(based ,on projection of ,trends for reqent years) 
Required pot nos. 
,pot nos, /mo . 
required pot no$. 
= # pot lIlts/potential # days fished 
= rnax . ( pot nos. /mo. ) 
pots/bQat - 4based on average for recent fishing seasons) 
Required boat nos. 
d 
1 
= Required pot oos,/.( pots/boat) 
i9 cost/pot (e.g. replacement of old pots) - based on survey data & SA study 
.$ cost/boat(e.g. fixed oyerheads including anti-fouling insurance, storage, etc.) 
$ cost/tdp '(rnainiy fuel) - based on survey data & SA study 
$ cost/pot,lift (bait, pot maintenance, etc.) - based on survey-data & SA study 
3 costflrg. catch (deck labour) - based on swey ,data & SA study 
Total Costs = 
- ,based on s w e y  data & SA study 
(cost/kg. of catch* annual catch) + 
(cost/pgt lift* Number of pot lifts) + 
(cost/trlp+ Reguired boat nos.*No. days fished) + 
&/pot* Required pot nos.) + 
st/boat* Required boat nos. ) 
Beach price 
(based on estfmated "workh/kg" -by P. Monaghan) 
Total Revenue 
= Sum of (monthly beach price/kg. of catch* monthly catch) 
Net (Return 
= Total Revenue - Total Costs 
APPENDIX 5: 
Historical Catch Patterns 
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. .  APPENDIX 6: 
Historical fish in^ Patterns 
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Individual Boat Fishing Patterns 
by Selected Months 
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Individual Scenario Results for the Proerammingl Model 
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Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (1 ) 
Case 1 : Variable Boat 8 Pot Nos. Season ends June 30 
LLS mananement - TAE set to ensure sustainable catch 8i breedinn stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 28,578.394 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$D$4 #'sCatch 10,795,339 8,999,188 
$E$4 #%Boats 669 558 
$F$4 #'spots 69,576 58,000 
$G$4 #'s Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 850,522 
$H$4 #'s Dec Pot Lifts 2,OI 8,782 1,682,893 
$1$4 #'s Jan Pot Lifts 1,243,343 1,036,473 
$J$4 #'s Feb Pot Lifts 1,464,628 1,220,940 
$K$4 #'s Mar Pot Lifts I ,801,387 1,501,668 
-____I-- $L$4 #'s AEr -- -__-I--______________________l__l_l_ Pot Lifts 1,663,190 1,386,465 
$M$4 #'s May Pot Lifts 1,310,311 1,092,298 
$N$4 #'s Jun Pot Lifts 908,661 75 7,4 76 
$0$4 #'s Jul Pot Lifts 0 ,  0 
$P$4 # s  Aug-Pot Lifts 0 0 
$Q$4 #'s Sep Pot Lifts 0 0 
$R$4 #'s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #'s Nov/Dec 20850533.74 17781 072.35 
$T$4 #'s Dec/Jan 151 93842.75 13057959.21 
$U$4 #'s Jan/Feb I 13009709.79 I 1229776.95 
$V$4 #'s Feb/Mar I 1 0997060.48 9544688.088 
$W$4 #'s Mar/Apr 7407667.372 6545336.2 
4.1 E+06 $X$4 #'s Apr/May 4.5E+06 
$Y$4 #'s May/Jun 3.OE+06 2.8€+06 
$Z$4 #'s Jun/Breed 2.1E+06 2.1 E+06 
1-_-_______-----1------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
--_-_-_____---_I~----__---__---_-_______I________________--__ 
---. ----------------- ----------------_-______________________________I______________________ 
Answer, Report 2 
Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (4) 
Case 2: Variable Pot Nos. but Constant Boat Nos. - Season ends June 30 
LLS mananement - TAE set to ensure sustainable catch 8i breeding stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value - 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 15,777,789 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
.10,795,339 8,999,188 $D$4 #'sCatch 
$E$4 f'sBoats 669 669 
$F$4 #'spots 69,576 58,000 
$G$4 #s Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 850,522 
-_--------- 2,018,782 1,682,893 $H$4 Ps Dec Pot Lifts 
$1$4 #s Jan Pot Lifts 1,243,343 1,036,473 
$J$4 #'s Feb Pot Lifts 1,464,628 1,220,940 
$K$4 #'s Mar Pot Lifts 1,801,387 1,501,668 
$L$4 #% Apr Pot Lifts I_- 1,663,190 1,386,465 
$M$4 #s May Pot Lifts 1,310,311 1,092,298 
$N$4 # s  Jun Pot Lifts 908.661 757.476 
-__ll----__l--_I------------------_II 
$034 #s Jul Pot Lifts 0 0 
0 0 $P$4 #s Aug Pot Lifts 
3Q$4 #s Sep Pot Lifts 0 0 
$R$4 #s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #'s NovIDec 20850533.74 17781 072.35 
15193842.75 13057959.21 $T$4 #sDeclJan 
$U$4 #s JanIFeb 13009709.79 1 1229776.95 
$V$4 #sFeb/Mar 10997060.48 9544688.088 
$W$4 #s MarlApr 7407667.372 6545336.2 
4.5E+O6 - 4.1 E+06 $X$4 #s AprIMay 
$Y34 #s MaylJun 3.OE+06 2.8E+06 
$2$4 #s JunIBreed 2.1E+06 2.1 E+06 
----- 






Answer Report 3 
Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQ6 (1 ) 
Case 3: Constant Boat 4% Pot Nos. -Variable Closed Season 
Competitive TAG set to ensure sustainable catch 8 breedina stock 
> 
Target Cell (Max) 








$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 13,233,586 
jjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$D$4 #sCatch 10,795,339 8,996,809 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 669 
$F$4 #'spots _1__1______-1--____________^11__^___41__--- 69,576 69,576
$G$4 # s  Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 1,020,278 
$H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 2,oi 8,782 2,OI 8,782 
$1$4 # s  Jan Pot Lifts 1,243,343 1,243,343 
. - - - - - ~  $J$4 # s  Feb Pot -I_-___-I-___ Lifts ~ .---I- ~ ------- 1,464,628 1,464,628 
$K$4 #s Mar Pot Lifts 1,801,387 1,801,38~ 
$L$4 # s  Apr Pot Lifts 1,663,190 1,202,299 
$M$4 # s  May Pot Lifts 1,310,31 I 0 
. - - - ~ - -  $N$4 #'s Jun Pot ~ ~ ~ _ _ ~ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ ~  Lifts 908 661 0 
$0$4 # s  Jut Pot Lifts 0 0 
$P$4 #'s Aug Pot Lifts 0 0 
$Q$4 #s Sep Pot Lifts 0 0 
.1---__--_--1--11---------1------1_--I-I------------̂-̂----_-___ $R$4 #s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
------- 
$S$4 # s  Nov/Dec 20850533.74 17444203.49 
$T$4 # s  Dec/Jan 15193842.75 11852232.78 
$U$4 #s Jan/Feb 1300Q709.79 9731 590.409 
$V$4 # s  Feb/Mar 10997060.48 7781 225.371 
$W$4 #s Mar/Apr 7407667.3r&2933.129 
$X$4 #s AprIMay 4.5E+06 2.2E+06 
$Y$4 # s  May/Jun 3.OE+06 2.1 E+06 
$2$4 #'s Jun/Breed 2.1 E+06 2.1 E+06 
--_I---_II--_-_ - _- ___l____-_l__ 
Answer Report 4 
Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: @/VRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (7) 
Case 4: Variable Boat & Pot Nos. Season ends June 30 
ITQs & TAG set to ensure sustainable catch & breedina stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 38,631,710 
Adiustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value - 
$084 --#s Catch 10.795.339 9.000.000 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 477 
$F$4 #spots 69.576 49.600 
$G$4 #s Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 7441007 
2,018,782 1,488,013 $H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 
$1$4 #s Jan Pot Lifts 1,243,343 1,289,611 
$J$4 #s Feb Pot Lifts 1,464,628 1,240,011 
$K$4 #s Mar Pot Lifts 1,801,387 1,388,812 
1,339,212 $L$4 #s Apr Pot Lifts 
$M$4 #s May Pot Lifts 1,310,311 1,289,611 
$N$4 #s Jun Pot Lifts 908,66 1 1,091,210 
$0$4 #s Jul Pot Lifts 0 0 
___________________________________I____-- 
- - - ~  1,663,190 ~- -I--___ 
$Q$4 #s Sep Pot Lifts 0 0 
$R$4 #s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #'s Nov/Dec 20850533.74 17963528.02 
15193842.75 13744763.75 - $T$4 .#s Dec/Jan 
$U$4 -#s Jan/Feb 1 3009709.79 1 151 7628.1 2 
$V$4 #s Feb/Mar 10997060.48 9804081.78 











Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (3) 
Case 5: Variable Pot Nos. but Constant Boat Nos. - Season ends June 30 
ITQs & TAC set to ensure sustainable catch & breedina stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value - 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 18,862,472 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$D$4 #sCatch 10,795,339 9,o0o,ooo 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 669 
$F$4 #spots 69,576 69,576 
$G$4 # s  Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 1,043,640 
$H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 2,OI 8,782 1,484,522 
$1$4 # s  Jan Pot Lifts 1 243,343 0 
$J$4 t's Feb Pot Lifts 1,464,628 0 
---------_-_--___l_l---------------~----~ 
I---- --- ---- ----I---------___1______________1__1----- L II_-_______________ 
$K$4 # s  Mar Pot Lifts 1,801,387 1,948,128 
$L$4 t's Apr Pot Lilts 1,663, I 90 1,878,552 
$M$4 # s  M a s o t  Lifts 1,310,311 1,808,976 
$N$4 # s  Jun Pot Lifts 908,661 1,530,672 
$0$4 # s  Jul Pot Lifts 0 0 
$P$4 # s  Aug Pot Lifts 0 0 
0 0 $Q$4 # s  Sep Pot Lifts 
$R$4 # s  Oct Pot Lifts 0 0' 
$S$4 #'s Nov/Dec 20850533.74 17542944.1 9 
$T$4 # s  Dec/Jan 151 93842.75 13341 267.69 
$U$4 #'s Jan/Feb 13009709.79 13087783.6 
$V$4 #'s Feb/Mar 10997060.48 128391 15.72 
$W$4 # s  Mar/Apr 7407667.372 8939352.1 44 
$X$4 # s  Apr/May 4,5E+06 5.7E+06 
3.OE+06 3.5E+06 $Y$4 # s  May/Jun 
$Z$4 #'s Jun/Breed 2.1 E+06 2.1 E+06 
- -- l______l___lll_______-_l-lll 
-----l--------_l---______ll_l_______ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
--I -l--------l----_----________I___________--l- 
Answer Report 11 
Microsoft Excel S.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (1 ) 
Case 11 : Variable Boat 8 Pot Nos. + more Potshoat Season ends June 30 
LLS manaaement - TAE set to ensure sustainable catch (L breedina stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 46,393,504 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$OW #sCatch 10,795,339 8,999.1 88 
$E$4 WsBoats 669 403 
$F$4 PsPots 69,576 58,000 
$G$4 #s Nov Pot L ib  1,020,278 850,522 
$H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 2,010,782 1,682,893 
$1$4 #Is Jan Pot Lifts 1,243,343 1,036,473 
$J34 f s  Feb Pot Lifts 1,464,628 1,220,940 
$K$4 #s Mar Pot Lffs 1,801,387 1,501,668 
$L$4 #'s Apr Pot Lifts 1,663,190 1,386,465 
$M$4 #s May Pot Lifts 1,310,311 1,092,298 
$N$4 #s Jun Pot Lifts 908,661 757,476 
$0$4 #s Jul Pot Lifts 0 0 
0 $P$4 #'s Aug Pot Lifts 0 
$Q$4 f s  Sep Pot Lifts 0 0 
$R$4 #s oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #sNov/Dec 20850533.74 17781 072.35 
$T$4 #sDec/Jan 151 93842.75 13057959.21 
$US4 #'sJan/Feb 13OO9709.79 11 229776.W 
$V$4 #sFeb/Mar 1 O997060.48 9544688.088 
$W$4 #Is MarlApr 7407667.372 6545336.2 
$X$4 #s AprIMay - 4.5E+06 4.1 E+06 
--- 
$Y$4 #Is MayiJun 3.OE+06 2.8E+06 














Microsoft Excel 6.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: wRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (5) 
Case 14: Variable Boat & Pot Nos. + more potslboat Season ends June 30 
ITQs & TAC set to ensure sustainable catch & breeding stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,366 53,866,888 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
3$4 #sCatch 10,795,339 9,000,000 
F$4 PsBoats 669 344 
=$4 #'spots 69,576 49,600 
$G$4 # s  Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 744,007 
$H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 2,OI 8,782 1,488,013 
$1$4 # s  Jan Pot Lifts 1.243.343 I .289.61 I - 
.-----------l__-------__l__r_____________111_____1__---------- 
$J$4 #'s Feb Pot Lifts 1,464,628 1,240,011 
$K$4 # s  Mar Pot Lifts 1,801,387 I ,388.81 2 
$L$4 #'s AEr Pot Lifts 1,6633 90 1,339,212 
-----I- --------~-_----_I_ 
$M$4 # s  May Pot Lifts 1,310,31 I I ,289,61 i 
$N$4 # s  Jun Pot Lifts 908,661 1,091,210 
$0$4 # s  Jul Pot Lifts 0 0 
$P$4 #s Aua Pot Lifts 0 0 
$Q$4 # s  Ser, Pot Lifts 0 0 
$R$4 # s  Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #s Nov/Dec 20850533.74 1 7963528.02 
$T$4 #s Dec/Jan 151 93842.75 13744763.75 
$U$4 #'s Jan/Feb 13009709.79 1 151 7628.1 2 
$V$4 # s  Feb/Mar 10997060.48 9804081.78 
$W$4 #'s Mar/Apr 7407667.372 701 1585.094 
$X$4 #'s Apr/May 4.5E+06 4.7E+06 
$Y$4 #'s May/Jun 3.OE+06 3.1 E+06 
$254 # s  Jun/Breed 2.1 E+06 2.1 E+06 
-----_I____--_-_____--_II______________________II____-_____ 
--_1----- ----- ------__----I---------_---___- 
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Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (7) 
Case 21 : Variable Boat & Pot Nos. - Extended Season ends Sentember 30 
LLS mananement - TAE set to ensure sustainable catch 8 breedinn stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$C$5 Profit Total 20,100,105 49,283,960 
Adjustable Cells : 
Cell ', Name Oriclinal Value Final Value - 
9,000,000 9,000,000 $D$4 &Catch 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 445 
$F$4 #'spots 69,576 46,231 
$G$4 #'s Nov Pot Lifts 676,636 676,636 
1,331,648 ~- 1,331,648 $H$4 #'s Dec Pot Lifts 
$J$4 #'s Feb Pot L i i  1,152,990 1,151,680 
$K$4 #'s Mar Pot Lifts 1,224,385 1,223,901 
$L$4 #s Apr Pot Lifts 1,248,228 1,248,228 
$M$4 #'s May Pot Lifts 1 ,I 04,851 1 ,104,851 
$N$4 #'s Jun Pot Lifts 823,049 823,049 
$084 # s  Jul Pot Lifts 636,466 636,466 
551,020 - 551,020 $P$4 #Is Aug Pot L ib  
$Q$4 #'s Sep Pot Lifts 600,000 600,000 
$R$4 #'s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #'s NovIDec 21 337889.33 21 337889.33 
$T$4 #'s Dec/Jan ----- 17436408.83 17448394.08 
$U$4 '#'s Jan/Feb 15563692.06 155754- 
$V$4 # s  Feb/Mar 13879744.3 13886469.43 
$W$4 #s Mar/Apr 1 131 9279.3 1 131 4875.59 
9.OE+06 _I 9.OE+06 $X$4 #s Apr/May 
$Y$4 #'s May/Jun 7.6E+06 7.6€+06 
$2$4 #'sJun/Jul 6754765.677 6750608.239 
$M$4 #s JuVAug 6.OE+06 6.OE+06 
5.3E+06 5.3E+06 $AB34 #'s Aug/Sep 
$AC$4 # s  Sep/Oct 4.6E+06 4.6E+06 
$AD$4 #'s OctlBreed 4.5E+06 4.5E +06 
-l-----_l ----__ 
-----_-___ 
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Case 22: Variable Pot Nos. & Constant Boat Nos. - Season ends Se~tember30 
LLS manaaement - TAE set to ensure sustainable catch 8 breedina stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value - 
$C$5 Profit Total 20,100,105 20,084,344 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
9,000 ,OOo 
$E$4 #'sBoats 669 669 
$F$4 #'spots 69,576 69,576 
$G$4 #'s Nov Pot LiRs 676,636 676,636 
$H$4 #s Dec Pot ----I------- Lifts -l--_ll_ _ 1,331,648 1,331,648 
$64 #'s Jan Pot Lifts 1,011,116 1,011,116 
$J$4 #'s Feb Pot Lifts l,152,99O 1,151,680 
$K$4 # s  Mar Pot Lifts 1,224,385 1,223,901 
$L$4 #'s 4 r  VI_ Pot Lifk ----_---- __ 1,248,228 1,248,228 
$M$4 #'s May Pot Lifts 1,104,851 1 , 104,851 
$N$4 #'s Jun Pot Lifts 82 3 , 049 823,049 
$0$4 # s  Jul Pot Lifts 636,466 636,466 
$P$4 #s Aug Pot Lifts --------_ 551,020 551,020 
$Q$4 #s Sep Pot Lifts 600,000 600,000 
$R$4 #'s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #s Nov/Dec 21 337889.33 21 337889.33 
$T$4 # s  Dec/Jan 17436408.83 17448394.08 
$U$4 # s  Jan/Feb 15563692.06 15575449.59 
$V$4 # s  Feb/Mar 13879744.3 13886469.43 
$W$4 #'s Mar/Apr 11 31 9279.3 1 131 4875.59 
9.OE+06 ----- $X$4 #Is Apr/May 
$Y$4 #s May/Jun 7.6E+06 7.6E+06 
$2$4 #s Jun/Jul 6754765.677 6750608.239 
$AA$4 #'s Jul/Aug 6.OE+06 6.OE+06 
5.3E+06 ---- $AB$4 #'s AugISep 
$AC$4 #'s Sep/Oct 4.6E+06 4.6E+06 
$AD$4 #'s OcVBreed 4.5E+O6 4.5E+06 
_----- ----_I-- $D$4 WsCatch ---__------__- --I--------- 9,000,000 
-- ---------- ------ 
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Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQ6 (6) 
Case 24: Variable Boat & Pot Nos. - Extended Season ends September 30 
ITQ's & TAC set to ensure sustainable catch & breedina stock 
Target Cell (Max) - . 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value - 
$C$5 Profit Total 34.282.51 6 55.31 4.285 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
10,795,339 9,000,000 $D$4 #s Catch 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 402 
$F$4 #spots 69,576 41,804 
$G$4 #s Nov Pot Lilts 1.020.278 627.061 
__---1--_1____-_____------------------------------------ 
$H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 1,058,252 1,2543 22 
$1$4 #s Jan Pot Lifts 1,043,343 1,086,906 
$J$4 #s Feb Pot Lifts 1.064.628 1 .O45.102 
----I--__I_______--_______ -- - 
$K$4 # s  Mar Pot Lifts 1,501.387 1.170.514 
1,3633 90 1 ,I 28,710 $L$4 #s Apr Pot Lifts 
$M$4 #s May Pot Lifts 1,310,311 1,086,906 
$N$4 #s Jun Pot Lifts 908,66 1 91 9,690 
--------I----_--_ 
$0$4 #s Jul Pot Lifts 908,661 752,473 
$P$4 # s  Aug Pot Lifts 908,661 752,473 
$Q$4 #s Sep Pot Lifts 908,661 752,473 
$R$4 Ws Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
-_I------__--___-___1_______________11__-------------- 
$S$4 #s Nov/Dec 20861 600 21 406598.93 
$T$4 #s Dec/Jan 1 5204699 14679580.1 9 
$U$4 #s Jan/Feb 13020360 -12743703.14 
$V$4 #s Feb/Mar 11007508 11241805.1 
$W$4 #s Mar/Apr 741 791 6 8831 645.881 
6.8E+06 $X$4 #s Apr/May 
$Y$4 #s May/Jun 3.OE+06 5.5E+06 
$2$4 # s  Jun/Jul 2.1E+06 4.5E+06 
-- -__-----__-__I-_---_________ 
---__--- 4.5E+06 --___ -----------_I-------------- 
L 
t 
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Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: @/WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (6) 
Case 25: Variable Pot Nos. & Constant Boat Nos. - Season ends September30 
ITQ's & TAC set to ensure sustainable catch & breedinct stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 








Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 669 
$F$4 #sPots 69,576 69,576 
$G$4 # s  Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 1,043,640 
--------------------------------------------------~---------------- $0$4 #sCatch 10,795,339 9,000,000 
~~~~_~~~~-~~~~~--~~~~~_~~~~~~~___-~~~~~__~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~_~_~ $H$4 # s  Dec Pot Lifts I 058,252 0 
$1$4 #s Jan Pot Lifts 1,043,343 0 
$J$4 #s Feb Pot Lifts 1,064,628 0 
$L$4 # s  Apr ------I------------__________l____l____ Pot Lifts 1,363,190 - 
$K$4 #s Mar Pot Lifts 1,501,387 1,948,128 
1,878,552 
$M$4 #'s May Pot Lifts 1,310,311 1,544,047 
$N$4 #'s Jun Pot Lifts 908,661 1,530,672 
$0$4 #s Jul Pot Lifts 908,66 1 1,252,368 
-------------------- $P$4 # s  AugPot ------___-____-_----_________________ Lifts 908,661 1,252,368 
$Q$4 # s  Sep Pot Lifts 908,661 1,252,368 
$R$4 #s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 # s  Nov/Dec 20861600 20829227.8 
$T$4 #s Dec/Jan 15204699 I 74281 10.4 
$U$4 #s Jan/Feb 13020360 I 7096976.3 
$V$4 # s  Feb/Mar 1 1 007508 1 6772 1 33.75 
$W$4 # s  Mar/Apr 7417916 12797642.83 
--------- $X$4 # s  AjrlMay ------ ----------------______________________ 4.5E+06 ----_-_--- 9.4E+06 
$Y$4 # s  MayiJun 3.OE+06 7.6E+06 
$2$4 # s  Jun/Jul 2.1E+06 6.OE+06 
$M$4 # s  Jul/Aug 2.1E+06 4.7E+06 
_------------------ $AB$4 # s  AuglSy --------------------_____________I______ 2,OE+06 3.4E+06 
$AC$4 # s  Sep/Oct 2 .OE+06 2.1 E+06 
$AD$4 # s  OctlBreed 2.OE+06 2.1 E+06 
-------------I----------------_----____________I__ 
I 
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Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (7) 
Case 31 : Variable Boat & Pot Nos. + more Potdboat - Season ends SePt. 30 
LLS manaaement - TAE set to ensure sustainable catch 8 breedina stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Orininal Value Final Value - 
$C$5 Profit Total 20,100,105 63,484,087 
Adjustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$0$4 PsCatch 9,000,OOO 9,ooo,o0O 
$E$4 #~Boats -- 669 321 
$F$4 #'sPots 69,576 46,231 
$G$4 #s Nov Pot Lifts 676.636 676.636 
$H$4 Is Dec Pot Lifts 1,331,648 1,331,648 
$1$4 #Is Jan Pot Lifts -__----_I 1,011,116 1,011,116 
$J$4 #s Feb Pot Lifts 1,152,990 1,151,680 
$K$4 #s Mar Pot Lifts 1,224,385 1,223,901 
$L$4 #'s Apr Pot Lifts 1,248,228 1,248,228 
$M$4 Ps May Pot Lifts 
$N$4 #'s Jun Pot Liffs 823,049 823,049 
1,104,851 -- 1,104,851 -------__-- 
~ -~~~ 
%OS4 Ps Jul Pot Lifts 636.466 636.466 
$PS4 #s Aua Pot Lifts 551.020 551.020 
SQ84 %Is SeD Pot Lifts 600.000 6OO.OOO 
$R$4 #'s Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 #'sNov/Dec 2 1 337889.33 2 1 337089.33 
$T$4 #s DedJan 17436400.03 17448394.08 
$U$4 #'s Jan/Feb ---_-_I--- 15563692.06 15575449.59 
%V$4 #sFeWMar 13879744.3 -73886469.43 
SW$4 #'s MarlADr 1 131 9279.3 1 131 4875.59 
$X$h #'s AprlNlay 9.OE+06 9.OE+06 
$Y$4 #'s May/Jun ?.6E+06 7.6E+06 
$AA$4 #s JuVAug 6.OE+06 6.OE+06 
$AB4 #'s AugiSep 5.3E+06 5.3E+06 
- ----- -_----_--___ 
$Z$4 #s Jun/Jul 6754765.677 6750608.239 
~- 




SAD34 #'sOct/Breed 4.5E+06 4.5€+06 
Answer Report 34 
Microsoft Excel 5.0 Answer Report 
Worksheet: [WRLITQ.XLS]WRLITQG (8) 
a 
' U  
4 
Case 34: Variable Boat & Pot Nos. + more potsiboat - Season ends Sept. 30 
ITQs & TAC set to ensure sustainable catch & breeding stock 
Target Cell (Max) 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$C$5 Profit Total 34,282,516 68,154,747 
AC djustable Cells 
Cell Name Original Value Final Value 
$E$4 #sBoats 669 290 
$F$4 #'spots 69,576 41,804 
$G$4 #'s Nov Pot Lifts 1,020,278 ,62 7,061 
~ _ - -  $H$4 #s Dec Pot Lifts 1 058252 1,2543 22 
$1$4 # s  Jan Pot Lifts 1,043,343 1,086,906 
$J$4 #'s Feb Pot Lifts 1,064,628 1,045,102 
$K$4 #'s Mar Pot Lifts 1,501,387 1 , I  70,514 
------- $L$4 # s  AprPot -----___---__---__------------------------- Lifts 1,363 t 190 -____ 1 2 128,710 
$M$4 #s May Pot Lifts 1,310,31 I 1,086,906 
$N$4 # s  Jun Pot Lifts 908,66 1 91 9,690 
$0$4 #s Jul Pot Lifts 908,66 1 752,473 
----------- $P$4 # s  AugPot Lifts 908 L 661 _I___--- __ 752,473 _--_ 
$Q$4 #s Sep Pot Lifts 908,661 752,473 
$R$4 # s  Oct Pot Lifts 0 0 
$S$4 # s  NovlDec 20861 600 182951 74.08 
$T$4 #s Dec/Jan 1 5204699 1 4679580.19 
$U$4 # s  Jan/Feb 13020360 12743703.1 4 
$V$4 # s  Feb/Mar 11007508 11241805.1 
$W$4 # s  MarIApr 741 791 6 8831 645.881 
--_I-- $D$4 #'sCatch -- 10 L - t  795 339 I----- 9,000,000
-_LI--~---------------_-_____________~ 
---_I--- $X$4 #s AprIMay ------_____--_-_-___I___ 4.5€+06 6.8E+06 
$Y$4 # s  May/Jun 3.OE+06 5.5E+06 
$2$4 # s  Jun/Jul 2.1 E+06 4.5E+06 
$M$4 # s  JuVAug 2.1E+06 3.7E+06 
-------I---- $AB$4 # s  Au@q -_-------__------ __-- ----- -------------------------- 2 .OE+06 2.9E+06 
$AC$4 #s Sepzct 2.OE+06 2.1 E+06 
$AD$4 #s OcVBreed 2.OE+06 2.1 E+O6 
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